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INTRODUCTION
OF THE $240.7 BILLION DONATED TO U.S. charities in 2003, 75 percent was from individuals.1 Of that total, $145.7 billion 
was taken as itemized deductions on federal income 
tax returns. In addition, non-itemizers and non-fi l-
ers contributed $33.0 billion – contributions that 
received no special tax treatment.2 Under current 
law, only taxpayers who itemize may deduct from 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) their charitable 
donations in determining taxable income. In recent 
years, a number of different proposals have been 
put forth that would alter the tax treatment of giving 
by individuals. Some plans would extend a variant 
of the charitable deduction to non-itemizers (see 
CBO, 2002, 2007). Other plans — some compo-
nents of fundamental tax reform — would make 
changes such as imposing fl oors (or minimum 
levels of giving) that must be met before deduc-
tions are permitted or replacing the deduction with 
a nonrefundable tax credit. 
The proposed changes are often motivated by 
equity or effi ciency concerns. Some argue that 
the current system is inequitable because it favors 
high-income fi lers over other income groups who 
give. In terms of effi ciency, tax incentives for giv-
ing could be restructured so as to yield the same 
or more donations, while costing the government 
less in foregone tax revenue.
RECENT PATTERNS OF CHARITABLE GIVING
This paper uses Statistics of Income (SOI) data 
for 2003 in conjunction with data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine 
patterns of giving across the income distribution. 
Estimates are reported for giving and broken down 
by fi ling status (i.e., itemizers versus non-itemizers) 
and income group. Also examined are the recipients 
of those donations (i.e., the types of organizations 
receiving the donations) and at what rates people in 
different income groups give to those different types 
of organizations. Additionally, the cost to the federal 
government from allowing charitable deductions is 
estimated along with the degree to which different 
income groups benefi t from the deduction. All of 
those measures represent the baseline for the suc-
ceeding section, which analyzes the effect of pos-
sible tax changes on each of those measures.
Donations by Individuals
According to Giving USA, U.S. charities 
received $240.7 billion in donations (2.2 percent of 
gross domestic product) in 2003. Of that, I estimate 
that $179.6 billion (1.6 percent of GDP), or nearly 
75 percent, was donated by individuals. The other 
25 percent was donated by foundations, corpora-
tions, and estates (bequests). From the mid 1960s 
to the mid 1990s, individual giving rose steadily, 
even after accounting for infl ation. From the mid 
1990s to 2000, individual giving increased sharply, 
by over 50 percent in just fi ve years. That growth 
was likely closely tied to the stock market, which 
has historically been a good predictor of giving. 
With the stock markets decline, individual giving 
fell by 4 percent in 2001 and stagnated through 
2003 before increasing by over 10 percent from 
2003 to 2005.
Of the estimated $179.6 billion in individual 
donations for 2003, $145.7 billion was donated by 
itemizers; $31.8 billion was donated by non-item-
izing fi lers and $2 billion came from non-fi lers.3 Of 
all itemizers, 88 percent reported charitable dona-
tions; that number was 52 percent for non-itemizing 
fi lers. Giving is skewed towards those with the 
highest incomes. The 24 percent of itemizers with 
reported AGI exceeding $100,000 were responsible 
for 54 percent of all itemizer giving. As a share of 
income, giving is relatively stable for most of the 
income distribution, at about 2.5 percent of AGI. 
For those reporting more than $5 million in AGI, 
giving rates are often 4 percent or higher.4
Cost to the Government 
from Charitable Deductions
The cost to the government of the charitable 
deduction, as measured by foregone tax revenues, 
is referred to as a tax expenditure. The size of the 
tax expenditure is not self-evident from the total 
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dollars donated or deducted because the tax rate 
that would have applied to the income had it not 
been donated varies greatly across individuals – and 
the marginal rate can even vary for the same indi-
vidual, depending on how much he donates. Tax 
expenditures can be calculated using effective tax 
rates in conjunction with the amount donated.5 The 
effective tax rates are the tax rates that the income 
would have faced had it not been donated. Effective 
tax rates are often different from the statutory rates 
for a variety of reasons, including phaseouts and 
phaseins and the alternative minimum tax. Federal 
effective tax rates for returns in the SOI are imputed 
using CBO’s tax calculator. Overall effective tax 
rates would also include state and local taxes. 
However, those are omitted here because the focus 
is on the cost to the federal government. 
Charitable deductions are one of the tax codes 
largest tax expenditures – although substantially 
smaller than tax expenditures for health care, 
housing, and retirement savings. I estimate that 
for 2003, federal tax expenditures associated with 
the charitable deduction totaled $29.8 billion. That 
tax expenditure is attributable solely to itemizers 
since donations by non-itemizers were not deducted 
and thus subject to tax. Tax expenditures are even 
more concentrated among high-income filers 
than are donations. For example, those itemizers 
reporting more than $100,000 in AGI received 70 
percent, or $20.8 billion, of total tax expenditures 
for charitable contributions. 
Recipients of Donations
It is not clear from tax return data the degree to 
which different types of organizations benefi ted 
from individual donations.6 However, the Center 
on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) module of 
the PSID does ask respondents questions on the 
amount of donations and the types of organizations 
that receive their donations. Like the SOI, the PSID 
is a stratifi ed random sample of U.S. residents. 
The PSID is a much smaller sample and includes 
especially few respondents from the very top of 
the income distribution. According to the PSID, 
in 2002, 63.4 percent of the value of individual 
donations were made to religious organizations; 4.8 
percent of the value of donations were to educa-
tion; 10.3 percent to the needy; and, 4.2 percent to 
health, see Table 1.7 While many think of charity 
as primarily benefi ting the poor, the Center on 
Philanthropy estimates at least 69 percent of total 
giving is not directed to the poor.8
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OPTIONS FOR REFORM
How tax incentives for giving are structured can 
have a major impact on the costs to the federal gov-
ernment, the level of charitable giving, and which 
(or how many) taxpayers benefi t. Three important 
decisions are made in crafting each of the policy 
alternatives examined here. Decisions are made 
as to whether the tax benefi t should: (1) take the 
form of a deduction or a credit; (2) include non-
itemizers, or be restricted to itemizers; (3) include 
a fl oor (minimum level of donations) below which 
contributions are not subsidized.
Six Plans for Reform
Six different plans for reform are examined 
(see Table 2). The fi rst reform would make the 
charitable deduction above-the-line (i.e., avail-
able to both itemizers and non-itemizers). The 
second and third options would turn the charitable 
deduction into a nonrefundable tax credit. In one 
case, the option would include a dollar fl oor. In 
the other case, there would be no fl oor. The fourth 
case would only allow deductions for itemizers 
donating more than a $500 fl oor if single (and 
$1,000 for joint returns). The fi fth and sixth cases 
would impose a fl oor equal to 1 percent of AGI. 
In one case, donations exceeding 1 percent of AGI 
could be deducted only for itemizers. In the other 
case, all fi lers could deduct donations exceeding 
1 percent of AGI.
The fi rst plan would make charitable deductions 
above-the-line; thus, the same rules that now apply 
to itemizers would be extended to non-itemizers 
– allowing non-itemizers to subtract from AGI 
all of their charitable contributions (subject to the 
same restrictions as itemizers), in addition to the 
standard deduction. Under this scenario, taxpay-
ers can be expected to respond in several ways. 
Because, non-itemizers would be treated more 
favorably than under current law while the tax 
treatment of itemizers would not change, some 
itemizers would be expected to switch to non-item-
izers. Put another way, since the tax treatment of 
charitable contributions would now be identical 
for itemizers and non-itemizers, charitable giving 
would no longer play a role in deciding whether 
to itemize. Thus, itemizers whose itemized deduc-
tions minus charitable deductions are less than the 
standard deduction would benefi t from switching 
to non-itemizers. Those switching would not be 
expected to alter their giving, however, since their 
after-tax price of giving does not change.9 The only 
group whose giving might be expected to respond 
is non-itemizers with positive tax liabilities, since 
their after-tax price of giving would fall. For 
that group, the price per dollar of giving would 
fall (from $1) by the size of their marginal tax 
rate.10 
The second and third plans would replace the 
current deduction with an above-the-line nonre-
fundable tax credit. The tax credit would equal 25 
percent of allowable donations. Two variations of 
this plan are analyzed. One would not impose a 
fl oor on allowable contributions, while the other 
would only credit contributions exceeding $500 for 
singles ($1,000 for joint returns). Here, taxpayers 
can be expected to respond in several ways. Again, 
charitable giving will not infl uence the decision to 
itemize because any tax savings from charitable 
giving are the same independent of that decision. 
Thus, current itemizers whose allowable item-
ized deductions minus charitable deductions are 
Policy 
Alternatives
Current Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
Non-itemizers 
Eligible
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Floor for Eligible 
Donations
No
No
No
$500/$1000
$500/$1000
0.01×AGI
0.01×AGI
Credit or 
Deduction
Deduction
Deduction
Credit
Credit
Deduction
Deduction
Deduction
Donationsa
$177.5b
≈
↑
↑
≈ 
≈
≈
Costa
$29.8b
↑
↑
↑
↓ 
↓
↓
Table 2
a The column refl ects estimates assuming moderate behavioral responses.  For the six plans, estimates refl ect changes 
from current law.  ≈ implies a change of less than one-half of 1 percent. ↑ or ↓ implies an increase or decrease of 
more than 5 percent – with respect to cost, estimated changes are all in excess of 15 percent.
Source: Congressional Budget Offi ce
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less than the standard deduction would no longer 
choose to itemize. 
With no fl oor, the after-tax price of donating 
would rise for itemizers facing marginal tax rates 
greater than 25 percent. For itemizers facing mar-
ginal tax rates of less than 25 percent, the after-tax 
price would fall. Donating non-itemizers (with 
tax liabilities) would all face more favorable tax 
treatment under this plan. The net effect on giving 
depends on whether the increased giving by those 
whose after-tax price of giving falls exceeds the 
decrease in giving by those for whom the after-tax 
price rises. With the dollar fl oor, the after-tax price 
for the next dollar of giving would fall only for 
itemizers giving more than the fl oor who also face 
marginal tax rates of less than 25 percent and for 
non-itemizers giving more than the fl oor.
The fourth plan would only allow deductions by 
itemizers that exceed a fi xed dollar fl oor of $500 for 
individuals and $1,000 for joint fi lers. That change 
should not affect non-itemizers, since the charitable 
deduction would not be extended to them. The 
benefi ts to itemizers would be less generous than 
under current law; thus, some itemizers would 
switch to non-itemizers.11 Under this scenario, no 
fi ler would have an increased incentive to donate; 
however, many fi lers after-tax price on the last 
dollar of giving would remain unchanged. That 
would be true for all non-itemizers and for those 
who remain itemizers and donate more than $500 
if single ($1,000 if fi ling jointly).
The fi fth and sixth plans would allow deductions 
only for total contributions exceeding 1 percent of 
AGI. Two variations of this plan are analyzed. One 
would extend the deduction to all tax fi lers, while 
the other would continue to restrict deductions to 
itemizers.
Plan 5, allowing deductions for giving that 
exceeds 1 percent of AGI only for itemizers, would 
have similar implications as plan 4. To wit, the 
change would not affect non-itemizers and would 
make benefi ts to itemizers less generous than cur-
rent law. Thus, some itemizers would switch to 
non-itemizers.12 In contrast to plan 4, the fl oor for 
this alternative would be proportional to AGI and 
thus would be larger (than the fi xed dollar fl oor) 
for very high-income fi lers. That could result in 
more fi lers switching to non-itemizer status and 
may also do more to lessen costs.
Allowing deductions for giving by both item-
izers and non-itemizers that exceed 1 percent of 
AGI, as in plan 6, would reduce the benefi ts from 
itemizing in absolute terms and relative to not 
itemizing. The tax treatment of individual giving 
in that plan is very similar to that favored by the 
2005 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform. As with the other above-the-line scenarios, 
charitable giving would no longer play a role in the 
decision to itemize – since the tax benefi ts from 
giving are independent of that decision. Itemizers 
whose itemized deductions minus charitable deduc-
tions are now less than the standard deduction 
would no longer choose to itemize. Those itemizers 
giving less than 1 percent of AGI would have an 
incentive to give less because their after-tax price 
of giving would rise. For itemizers giving more 
than 1 percent of AGI, the after-tax price of giving 
another dollar would remain unchanged, although 
the average after-tax price of giving would rise. For 
non-itemizers giving less than 1 percent of AGI, the 
after-tax price of giving would remain unchanged. 
For itemizers giving more than 1 percent, the after-
tax price would fall, providing an incentive for 
those people to increase their giving.
Findings
An important caveat is in order to remind the 
reader that the measures of tax expenditures used 
in this analysis, while they superfi cially resemble 
revenue estimates, are not the same thing. Revenue 
estimates for specifi c legislation are the respon-
sibility of the Joint Committee on Taxation. The 
analyses here are purposely stylized to ignore many 
of the specifi c features that would be critical to 
an offi cial revenue estimate. The purpose of this 
analysis is to focus on the salient characteristics of 
the broad approaches to changing the tax treatment 
of charitable contributions.
From the analysis emerge several stylized facts 
(see Table 3). First, allowing above-the-line deduc-
tions greatly increases the number of taxpayers who 
benefi t from the tax incentive, but has little effect 
on donations and greatly increases costs to the 
government. Second, moving from a deduction to 
a 25 percent nonrefundable credit does the most of 
the six alternatives to increase donations, but that 
policy would also substantially increase costs.13 
Third, imposing fl oors, below which contributions 
are not subsidized, considerably lowers costs, while 
only nominally affecting contributions.
Overall donations across the six plans are very 
close to (2003) donations under current law (see 
Figure 1). The 25 percent credit used for plans 
2 and 3 raises donations by roughly 6.5 percent. 
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Total donations from the other plans all change 
by less than one-half of 1 percent. Changes to tax 
expenditures are much larger and have a much 
greater variance. Changes to tax expenditures range 
from an increase of more than one-half for the 25 
percent above-the-line credit (plan 2) to an almost 
one-quarter drop when imposing a 1 percent of 
AGI fl oor (plans 5 and 6).
Another way of evaluating the different plans is 
to compare how much each plan changes the tax 
expenditure per dollar of donation. This subsidy 
rate measure has the virtue of incorporating both 
costs (foregone tax revenue) and benefi ts (dona-
tions), instead of examining the two separately.14 
Here, the subsidy rate is defi ned as the average cost 
in foregone tax revenue per dollar of donations; or, 
in other words, the ratio of tax expenditures (or 
foregone tax revenue) to total donations. Based 
on that measure, plans that impose contribution 
fl oors are clearly the most cost-effective, while 
those that impose no fl oors and award benefi ts to 
both itemizers and non-itemizers are the least cost-
effective, see Table 3. While change in the subsidy 
rate differs greatly across plans, from an increase 
of $0.07 to a decrease of $0.04, within each plan 
the elasticity assumptions have almost no affect 
on the measure.
In general, extending the deduction to non-item-
izers increases the number of tax fi lers benefi ting 
from charitable incentives, but is costly and has 
little effect on donations. For example, making the 
current deduction above-the line, and imposing no 
other changes, increases the number of benefi cia-
ries by 35.2 million, but raises costs to the gov-
ernment by $7.2 billion (or more than 24 percent) 
and under the most optimistic scenario increases 
donations by just 0.1 of 1 percent. While costly, 
the benefi ts of extending the charitable deduction 
to non-itemizers tend to benefi t middle-income 
groups. Of the $7.2 billion drop in revenues, 73 
percent would go to taxpayers with AGI less than 
$75,000, while 5 percent would go to those with 
0
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Figure 1: Total Donations and Tax Expenditures Across Plans
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AGI greater than $200,000, see Table 4. In terms 
of the subsidy rate, this plan would raise the aver-
age cost per dollar of donations by $0.04 (or 19 
percent), from $0.17 to $0.21 per dollar donated. 
Plans 2, 3, and 6 also include an above-the-line 
benefi t, but those plans also contain other features, 
which affect the overall results.
It would be possible to reduce the cost of this 
plan by reducing the size of the standard deduc-
tion. Since the latter was intended to encompass 
some level of charitable giving, pairing a reduction 
in the standard deduction with an above-the-line 
benefi t could be construed as a reasonable trade-
off.
Like plan 1, plans 2 and 3 make no distinction 
between itemizers and non-itemizers, treating 
charitable contributions by both groups identically. 
However, those two plans are different from plan 
1 in that they do not offer a deduction but rather a 
25 percent credit. The credit considerably increases 
costs, but results in much more giving.15 Under plan 
2, which imposes no fl oor, the above-the-line credit 
would increase costs to the government by between 
$12.4 billion and $20.7 billion, or between 42 and 
70 percent. Changes to giving are highly dependent 
on the elasticity assumptions, and range from $0 
to $36.4 billion. Plan 3 imposes a $500 fl oor for 
singles ($1,000 for joint fi lers), which substantially 
lowers the cost increase from the above-the-line 
credit, while maintaining most of the increased 
donations. Both plans 2 and 3 have higher subsidy 
rates, as measured by the average revenue cost 
per dollar donated, than both plan 1 and current 
law. Plan 2 would raise the average cost per dollar 
of donations to $0.24, or 41 percent greater than 
under current law. Because of the dollar fl oor, 
plan 3 is much is less costly per dollar of contribu-
tions, raising the average cost per dollar donated 
by 12 percent, or by $0.02 compared to current 
law.
Under plans 2 and 3, those with AGI less than 
$75,000 considerably increase their contributions 
because the 25 percent fl at-rate credit is often more 
generous for them than the current deduction. For 
those in the top three income tax brackets, the situ-
ation is reversed. Those fi lers would respond by 
reducing their donations somewhat. The effective 
subsidy going to those high income fi lers would 
fall as well (see Table 5).
For plans 4, 5, and 6, imposing a dollar or per-
cent of AGI fl oor on the deductibility of donations 
would lower the annual cost to the government by 
Table 4
Allow Non-Itemizers to Deduct Charitable Contributions
Estimated changes compared to the 2003 “baseline” and assuming moderate behavioral responses.
Plan 1
All Filers Non-Itemizers
Increase in:
Total
Less than $0
$0 to $10,000
$10,000 to $20,000
$20,000 to $30,000
$30,000 to $40,000
$40,000 to $50,000
$50,000 to $75,000
$75,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $200,000
$200,000 to $500,000
$500,000 to $1,000,000
$1,000,000 to $5,000,000
$5,000,000 to $10,000,000
$10,000,000 or more
Numbers are in millions.
Increases in the number of non-itemizers are exactly offset by decreases in the number of itemizers.
Benefi ciaries
35.6
   0.0
   1.0
   7.8
   8.5
   6.2
   4.0
   5.5
   1.7
   0.7
   0.1
0
0
0
0
Dollars 
Donated
   75.2
    0.0
    0.0
    0.5
    2.9
    7.6
   10.3
   19.4
   14.6
   19.8
0
0
0
0
0
Tax 
Expenditure
7,184
     0
    66
   619
1,109
1,083
   959
1,438
   901
   625
   161
    58
    74
    16
    74
Returns
5.4
0.0
0.1
0.4
0.6
0.7
0.7
1.4
0.8
0.5
0.1
 0.02
 0.01
  0.001
  0.001
Dollars 
Donated
33,466
     0
   259
1,329
2,284
2,564
2,943
7,245
4,471
4,574
1,692
   881
1,420
   541
3,264
Tax 
Expenditure
11,494
      0
     66
    654
 1,217
 1,247
 1,220
 2,142
 1,503
 1,452
    537
    275
    391
    132
    657
Source:  Author’s calculations based on SOI data.
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between $4.6 billion and $6.9 billion (or between 
15 and 23 percent) while reducing donations by 
no more than $682,000 (or 0.4 percent), see Table 
3, Table 6 and Table 7.16 Under the most extreme 
assumption, that giving is very responsive to tax 
incentives, giving would fall by between $939,000 
and $2.034 billion (or between 0.5 to 1.1 percent). 
In terms of tax expenditure per dollar donated, 
plans 4, 5, and 6 are clearly the lowest. Those plans 
would lower the cost per dollar donated by 18 to 24 
percent, or by $0.03 to $0.04 compared to current 
law. Most of the cost savings would come from 
those with AGI greater than $75,000. For plan 4, 
68 percent of the gain in revenue would come from 
those with AGI above $75,000. For plans 5 and 6, 
that number would be 84 percent.
Some policy alternatives include a combination 
of characteristics that separately may have oppos-
ing effects. For example, plans 3 and 6 would 
both extend benefi ts to non-itemizers, while also 
imposing a floor on charitable deductions. As 
noted earlier, extending benefi ts to non-itemizers 
should considerably increase costs while imposing 
a fl oor should help to contain costs. For plan 3, the 
net effect is considerably higher costs, suggesting 
that the cost increases from making the benefi t 
above-the-line dominate the savings from the dol-
lar fl oor. That is not to say that the dollar fl oor is 
unimportant. When compared to plan 2, which is 
exactly the same as plan 3, except that it does not 
impose a fl oor, costs are nearly three times higher. 
(Also, note that plans 2 and 3 include a credit rather 
than a deduction, which factors into the results.) 
For plan 6, cost savings from a 1 percent AGI 
fl oor dominate the increased cost from extending 
the deduction to non-itemizers. Here costs are 
much lower than under current law. A 1 percent 
of AGI floor excludes more deductions from 
higher-income taxpayers than does a dollar fl oor. 
At the same time it includes more contributions of 
lower-income taxpayers. But, the revenue raising 
effects on higher-income taxpayers is much larger 
than the revenue losing effects on lower-income 
taxpayers. Additionally, restricting that plan to 
itemizers (plan 5) has little additional effect on 
costs. That is primarily because a 1 percent of 
AGI fl oor is high enough to exclude most non-
itemizers.
Table 6
Impose a Dollar Floor Above Which Contributions by Itemizers Are Deductible
Plan 4:  Floor of  $500 for singles and $1000 for joint fi lers
Estimated changes compared to the 2003 “baseline” and assuming moderate behavioral responses.
Increase in:
Total
Less than $0
$0 to $10,000
$10,000 to $20,000
$20,000 to $30,000
$30,000 to $40,000
$40,000 to $50,000
$50,000 to $75,000
$75,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $200,000
$200,000 to $500,000
$500,000 to $1,000,000
$1,000,000 to $5,000,000
$5,000,000 to $10,000,000
$10,000,000 or more
Numbers are in millions.
Tax expenditures for non-itemizers are 0 because they are not deductible.
Increases in the number of non-itemizers are exactly offset by decreases in the number of itemizers.
All Filers Non-Itemizers
Benefi ciaries
  -11.7
     0.0
     0.0
      -0.3
      -0.7
      -1.3
      -1.4
      -3.4
      -2.5
      -1.9
      -0.2
  -0.02
  -0.01
0
0
Dollars 
Donated
-316
     0
     0
  -7
 -14
 -30
 -37
 -83
 -71
 -55
 -15
  -2
  -2
     0
     0
Tax 
Expenditure
-4,557
        0
        0
    -20
    -87
   -189
   -290
   -865
   -963
-1,516
   -496
    -88
    -39
     -2
     -1
Returns
 2.2
 0.0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.2
 0.3
 0.3
 0.6
 0.3
 0.1
  0.02
   0.004
   0.002
     0.0001
0
Dollars 
Donated
3,246
     0
    85
   304
   310
   465
   426
   924
   423
   222
    56
   15
    15
     1
     0
Source: Author’s calculations based on SOI data.
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CONCLUSION
This paper uses Statistics of Income (SOI) data 
for 2003 in conjunction with data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine 
patterns of giving across the income distribution. 
The paper evaluates six plans for reforming the tax 
treatment of charitable giving, including an option 
similar to the one favored by the President’s Tax 
Reform Panel and options that share some features 
with the President’s fi scal year 2004 and fi scal year 
2005 budget proposals.
I fi nd that the structure of tax incentives for 
giving can have a major impact on costs to the 
federal government, the level of charitable giving 
and which (or how many) taxpayers benefi t from 
the preference. 
Imposing fl oors substantially improves the cost 
effectiveness of tax preferences for charitable giv-
ing. Floors substantially reduce the tax with mini-
mum effects on contributions relative to similar 
proposals without fl oors. For the fl oors considered 
here, the subsidy rate is reduced to $0.03 to $0.04 
per dollar of contribution, depending on other 
characteristics of the preference.
In general, extending the deduction to non-
itemizers is by itself costly and has little effect 
on donations. For example, making the current 
deduction above-the line, and imposing no other 
changes, increases the number of benefi ciaries by 
35.6 million and raises tax expenditures by $7.2 
billion (or more than 24 percent), but under the 
most optimistic scenario increases donations by 
just 0.1 of 1 percent. In terms of effi ciency, this 
plan would raise the average cost per dollar of 
donations by 19 percent, from $0.17 to $0.21 per 
dollar donated.
Replacing the deduction for charitable giving 
with a 25 percent above-the-line tax credit greatly 
increases costs, but could result in substantially 
more giving. The credit would increase annual tax 
expenditures for giving by between $5.1 billion 
and $15.2 billion, or between 17 and 51 percent. 
Changes to giving are highly dependent on the 
assumptions about taxpayer responsiveness, and 
range from $0 to $36.4 billion. The costs can be 
substantially altered by combining the credit with 
a fl oor. Adding a $500 fl oor to the plan for singles 
($1,000 for joint fi lers) substantially lowers the cost 
increase from the credit, while maintaining most 
of the increased donations. Without the fl oor, the 
credit is much less effi cient than current law, rais-
ing the average cost per dollar donated by $0.07 
(or 41 percent). With the fl oor, the average cost 
per dollar donated rises by $0.02 compared to 
current law.
Notes
 1 See page 8 of Giving USA 2004.
 2 Throughout this paper, charitable contributions are 
defi ned as in Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchap-
ter B, Part VI, Section 170, Subsection c of the U.S. 
Code.
 3 Estimates for itemizers are based on numbers reported 
on income tax returns. Estimates for non-itemizers are 
based on imputations based on data from the Survey of 
Consumer Expenditures and the Survey of Consumer 
Finances. The imputation procedure was calibrated 
so that the total for non-itemizers roughly equals the 
number reported by Giving USA.
 4 For itemizers, giving as a share of income is U-shaped. 
The giving rate is larger at both tails and smallest in 
the middle of the distribution.
 5 Effective marginal tax rates measure the share of an 
additional dollar of income that is paid to the govern-
ment. Effective tax rates take into account the many 
complexities and interactions between different parts 
of the tax code and thus are often different from 
statutory tax rates. CBO’s tax model is used to impute 
effective tax rates applicable for deductions. Tax ex-
penditures are calculated assuming that fi lers would 
have made no behavioral responses in the event that 
contributions were not deductible, although fi lers are 
assumed to switch from itemizers to non-itemizers if 
the standard deduction is larger than the fi lers remain-
ing itemized deductions.
 6 For non-itemizers, donations are not reported. For 
itemizers, the recipient organization is sometimes 
reported, but many organizations serve multiple func-
tions. 
 7 According to Giving USA, 35.9 percent of all giving 
was to religious organizations for 2003. While all 
giving is roughly one-third larger than individual 
giving, that number seems inconsistent with the PSID 
estimate. For 2000, the PSID-based estimate for indi-
vidual giving to religion was 56.7 percent. 
 8 See Sandburg (2007).
 9 That assumes that income effects are small and ignores 
the fact that a small percentage of taxpayers move 
into a lower marginal tax bracket because of the 
change. 
10 For most of those taxpayers, the average and marginal 
price per dollar of giving will be the same. However, 
deducting charitable donations could move some 
taxpayers to a lower tax bracket, in which case the 
marginal cost of giving would be greater than the 
average cost.
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11  Those itemizers for whom itemized deductions minus 
the lesser of their charitable contributions or $500 (for 
individuals) are less than the standard deduction would 
no longer choose to itemize.
12  Those itemizers for whom itemized deductions minus 
the lesser of their charitable contributions or 2 percent 
of their AGI are less than the standard deduction would 
no longer choose to itemize.
13  Costs are measured in terms of (foregone) tax revenue 
to the government. Those costs are referred to as tax 
expenditures and are discussed in more detail in the 
previous section.
14 The term “subsidy rate” is identical with the term 
“treasury effi ciency” in the literature. That former term 
is eschewed here to avoid confusion with economic 
effi ciency – a very different concept.
15 That assumes a modest elasticity. Assuming a larger 
elasticity results in an even greater increase in dona-
tions. At the other extreme, assuming an elasticity 
of zero, would imply no change in donations (under 
any of the plans), since that assumption implies that 
donations are not infl uenced by tax incentives.
16 Plan 3 also includes a dollar fl oor, but yields somewhat 
different results due to other features of the plan that 
are discussed shortly.
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